A Functional Naturalism

I provide two arguments against value-free naturalism. Both are based on considerations concerning biological teleology. Value-free naturalism is the thesis that both (1) everything is, at least in principle, under the purview of the sciences and (2) all scientific facts are purely non-evaluative. First, I advance a counterexample to any analysis on which natural selection is necessary to biological teleology. This should concern the value-free naturalist, since most value-free analyses of biological teleology appeal to natural selection. My counterexample is unique in that it is likely to actually occur. It concerns the creation of synthetic life. Recent developments in synthetic biology suggest scientists will eventually be able to develop synthetic life. Such life, however, would not have any of its traits naturally selected for. Second, I develop a simple argument that biological teleology is a scientific but value-laden notion. Consequently, value-free naturalism is false. I end with some concluding remarks on the implications for naturalism, the thesis that (1). Naturalism may be salvaged only if we reject (2). (2) is a dogma that unnecessarily constrains our conception of the sciences. Only a naturalism that recognizes value-laden notions as scientifically respectable can be true. Such a naturalism is a functional naturalism

The Implications of Interactions for Science and Philosophy

Reductionism has dominated science and philosophy for centuries. Complexity has recently shown that interactions---which reductionism neglects---are relevant for understanding phenomena. When interactions are considered, reductionism becomes limited in several aspects. In this paper, I argue that interactions imply non-reductionism, non-materialism, non-predictability, non-Platonism, and non-nihilism. As alternatives to each of these, holism, informism, adaptation, contextuality, and meaningfulness are put forward, respectively. A worldview that includes interactions not only describes better our world, but can help to solve many open scientific, philosophical, and social problems caused by implications of reductionism.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

The view from elsewhere: perspectives on ALife Modeling

Many artificial life researchers stress the interdisciplinary character of the field. Against such a backdrop, this report reviews and discusses artificial life, as it is depicted in, and as it interfaces with, adjacent disciplines (in particular, philosophy, biology, and linguistics), and in the light of a specific historical example of interdisciplinary research (namely cybernetics) with which artificial life shares many features. This report grew out of a workshop held at the Sixth European Conference on Artificial Life in Prague and features individual contributions from the workshop's eight speakers, plus a section designed to reflect the debates that took place during the workshop's discussion sessions. The major theme that emerged during these sessions was the identity and status of artificial life as a scientific endeavor

Multivariate Granger Causality and Generalized Variance

Granger causality analysis is a popular method for inference on directed interactions in complex systems of many variables. A shortcoming of the standard framework for Granger causality is that it only allows for examination of interactions between single (univariate) variables within a system, perhaps conditioned on other variables. However, interactions do not necessarily take place between single variables, but may occur among groups, or "ensembles", of variables. In this study we establish a principled framework for Granger causality in the context of causal interactions among two or more multivariate sets of variables. Building on Geweke's seminal 1982 work, we offer new justifications for one particular form of multivariate Granger causality based on the generalized variances of residual errors. Taken together, our results support a comprehensive and theoretically consistent extension of Granger causality to the multivariate case. Treated individually, they highlight several specific advantages of the generalized variance measure, which we illustrate using applications in neuroscience as an example. We further show how the measure can be used to define "partial" Granger causality in the multivariate context and we also motivate reformulations of "causal density" and "Granger autonomy". Our results are directly applicable to experimental data and promise to reveal new types of functional relations in complex systems, neural and otherwise.Comment: added 1 reference, minor change to discussion, typos corrected; 28 pages, 3 figures, 1 table, LaTe

Topology and Evolution of Technology Innovation Networks

The web of relations linking technological innovation can be fairly described in terms of patent citations. The resulting patent citation network provides a picture of the large-scale organization of innovations and its time evolution. Here we study the patterns of change of patents registered by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We show that the scaling behavior exhibited by this network is consistent with a preferential attachment mechanism together with a Weibull-shaped aging term. Such attachment kernel is shared by scientific citation networks, thus indicating an universal type of mechanism linking ideas and designs and their evolution. The implications for evolutionary theory of innovation are discussed.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures, submitted to Physical Review

Reduction and Emergence in Bose-Einstein Condensates

A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These include the relations between classical descriptions and different quantum treatments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking

The strong emergence of molecular structure

One of the most plausible and widely discussed examples of strong emergence is molecular structure. The only detailed account of it, which has been very influential, is due to Robin Hendry and is formulated in terms of downward causation. This paper explains Hendry’s account of the strong emergence of molecular structure and argues that it is coherent only if one assumes a diachronic reflexive notion of downward causation. However, in the context of this notion of downward causation, the strong emergence of molecular structure faces three challenges that have not been met and which have so far remained unnoticed. First, the putative empirical evidence presented for the strong emergence of molecular structure equally undermines supervenience, which is one of the main tenets of strong emergence. Secondly, it is ambiguous how the assumption of determinate nuclear positions is invoked for the support of strong emergence, as the role of this assumption in Hendry’s argument can be interpreted in more than one way. Lastly, there are understandings of causation which render the postulation of a downward causal relation between a molecule’s structure and its quantum mechanical entities, untenable

Engineers of Life? A Critical Examination of the Concept of Life in the Debate on Synthetic Biology

The concept of life plays a crucial role in the debate on synthetic biology. The first part of this chapter outlines the controversial debate on the status of the concept of life in current science and philosophy. Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse on its scientific and societal consequences is revealed as an exception. Here, the concept of life is not only used as buzzword but also discussed theoretically and links the ethical aspects with the epistemological prerequisites and the ontological consequences of synthetic biology. The second part examines this point of intersection and analyses some of the issues which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. The third part turns to the history of the concept of life. It offers an examination of scientific and philosophical discourses on life at the turn of the 20th century and suggests a surprising result: In the light of this history, synthetic biology leads to well-known debates, arguments, notions and questions. But it is concluded that the concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the actual practice of synthetic biology. In the fourth part I argue that with regard to the ethical evaluation of synthetic biology, the ambiguity of the concept of life is not as problematic as sometimes held because other challenges are more important. The question whether the activity of synthetic biological systems should be conceived as life or not is primarily theoretical